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This paper focuses on a radical change, in which organi- 
zations abandon an institutionalized template for arrang- 
ing their core activities, that is likely to occur in organiza- 
tional fields that have strong, local market forces and 
strong but heterogeneous institutional forces. We exam- 
ine the role of market forces and heterogeneous institu- 
tional elements in promoting divergent change in core 
activities among all U.S. rural hospitals from 1984 to 
1991. Results support the view that divergent change 
depends on both market forces (proximity to competitors, 
disadvantages in service mix) and institutional forces 
(state regulation, ownership and governance norms, and 
mimicry of models of divergent change).* 
Organizations often arrange their core activities according to 
accepted models, or templates, in their field. These tem- 
plates are patterns for arranging organizational behavior that 
specify organizational structure and goals and reflect a dis- 
tinct set of beliefs and values. Accounting and law firms, for 
example, have traditionally used templates that emphasized 
individual autonomy and equality among peers, what Green- 
wood and Hinings (1993, 1996) termed a professional part- 
nership model. Some templates are so repetitive and endur- 
ing across an entire organizational field that actors take it for 
granted that this pattern is the right way to organize (Oliver, 
1992). Yet organizations do abandon such templates, diverg- 
ing from accepted models in their field. What causes them to 
abandon an institutionalized template for arranging their core 
activities and replace this template with a substantially differ- 
ent one? 
Understanding the causes of such divergent organizational 
change is important both for understanding the change itself 
and for advancing neo-institutional theory. Until relatively 
recently, theory and research have focused on examining the 
successful reproduction and diffusion of organizational forms 
and practices (DiMaggio and Powell, 1991; Oliver, 1992; 
Scott, 1995). It is not yet clear how the theory can be extend- 
ed to account for divergent organizational change (Green- 
wood and Hinings, 1996; Kraatz and Zajac, 1996; Kraatz and 
Moore, 1998). Further, examining such change would help to 
link the "old" and "new" institutional theories (Greenwood 
and Hinings, 1996; Selznick, 1996; Hirsch and Lounsbury, 
1997). This is so because divergent change involves both a 
transformation in organizational goals, a focus of the original 
institutional school, and a transformation in widely held 
beliefs and norms, a focus of neo-institutional research (e.g., 
Zald and Denton, 1963; DiMaggio and Powell, 1991). 
Though theorists have proposed several explanations for 
divergent organizational change (e.g., DiMaggio, 1988; Oliver, 
1992; Thornton, 1995), recent conceptual papers (Greenwood 
and Hinings, 1996), case studies (Leblebici et al., 1991), and a 
few large-scale empirical studies (Davis, Diekmann, and Tins- 
ley, 1994; Kraatz and Zajac, 1996) have emphasized the 
importance of both market competition and institutional fac- 
tors in causing such change. Kraatz and Zajac (1996) found 
that local market forces (e.g., consumer demand) prompted 
divergent changes in curricula among U.S. liberal arts col- 
leges (e.g., offering business degrees). In contrast, results 
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from Davis, Diekmann, and Tinsley (1994) suggested that 
institutional factors caused decreased use of the conglomer- 
ate form of organization in the 1980s-the very idea of this 
form was no longer legitimate. One explanation for these 
inconsistent results is that there are varying market and insti- 
tutional conditions under which divergent organizational 
change occurs. Earlier conceptual and later empirical work in 
neo-institutional theory (e.g., Scott and Meyer, 1983; Dacin, 
1997) has emphasized that organizational fields vary in both 
the relative strength and heterogeneity of institutional and 
market pressures they hold for organizations. Thus, prior 
studies may yield different explanations for divergent organi- 
zational change because they examined organizational fields 
that differ in the kinds of market and institutional forces that 
affect them. In this paper, we formulate and test hypotheses 
on the effects of both market and institutional forces on 
divergent organizational changes, using data on the organiza- 
tional field of rural hospitals between 1984 and 1991. 
DIVERGENT ORGANIZATIONAL CHANGE 
The Role of Market Forces 
Divergent organizational change is more likely to occur within 
organizational fields that have strong, local market forces and 
strong, but heterogeneous, institutional forces. Organizations 
face strong, local market forces to the extent that there is 
low local demand for their products and services and intense 
local competition from similar organizations. Prior research 
suggests that competition among similar organizations is 
more intense at local levels than at population levels (Zucker, 
1989; Hannan and Carroll, 1992: 146; Baum, 1996). Low local 
demand for organizations' products and services and intense 
competition among similar organizations at the local level 
lead to divergent change as less-fit competitors move out of 
a market in search of alternatives to their current templates 
(Hawley, 1950: 201-203; Delacroix, Swaminathan, and Solt, 
1989; Amburgey, Kelly, and Barnett, 1993; Haveman, 1993; 
Greve, 1998). Organizations that hold favorable positions rela- 
tive to their competitors in such markets can perform well 
enough to maintain their status quo (Greve, 1996). In con- 
trast, organizations that have comparative disadvantages in 
key areas, such as size or product mix, need to make sub- 
stantial changes in templates as they seek domains in which 
they can hold a competitive advantage (Hannan and Free- 
man, 1977, 1989; Baum and Haveman, 1997). 
Demand. Insufficient consumer demand for organizations' 
products and services is an important cause of divergent 
organizational change. Local markets with high consumer 
demand may promote convergent change, because organiza- 
tions might have adequate resources to adopt forms and 
practices from successful competitors (Hawley, 1968). In 
contrast, markets with low levels of local consumer demand 
are likely to promote divergent change because these mar- 
kets cannot support all of the organizations that are operating 
with the same or similar resource needs. Kraatz and Zajac 
(1996) found, for example, that less consumer demand for 
traditional iberal arts degrees was significantly related to 
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Divergent Change 
divergent changes in the curricula of liberal arts colleges. 
Thus, we hypothesize: 
Hi: The lower the level of demand in an organization's local market, 
the more likely it is to make a divergent change. 
Geographic distance between competitors. Results from 
several empirical studies show that the addition of an organi- 
zation to a population has stronger competitive effects on 
neighboring organizations than on those that are more distant 
(Baum and Singh, 1994a, 1994b; Hannan et al., 1995; Lomi, 
1995; Baum and Haveman, 1997). This means that organiza- 
tions that have similar products and services and are located 
in close proximity in local markets will face relatively strong 
competition, because they are trying to attract the same lim- 
ited pool of consumers. As a result, competition in a local 
market increases the likelihood that one or more of the proxi- 
mate organizations will perform poorly and will thus need to 
make a divergent change to differentiate itself from competi- 
tors and escape more losses. Thus, we hypothesize: 
H2: The closer the geographic distance between an organization and 
its closest market competitors, the more likely that the organization 
will make a divergent change. 
Size relative to competitors. The size of organizations rela- 
tive to competitors in their local market is likely to influence 
which of them will be unsuccessful and thus be forced to 
search for an alternative template. Specifically, there is likely 
to be a competitive disadvantage for organizations that are 
relatively smaller than their local counterparts (Baum, 1996). 
This disadvantage appears to result, at least in part, from the 
superior ability of larger organizations to acquire resources 
that are needed to produce goods and services efficiently 
and effectively (Aldrich and Auster, 1986). For example, com- 
pared with larger organizations in their market area, small 
organizations will have more difficulty both in raising capital 
to purchase technology and in hiring specialized personnel. 
Thus, we hypothesize: 
H3: Organizations that are smaller than their market competitors are 
more likely to make divergent changes. 
Service and product mix relative to competitors. Services 
and products differ along several dimensions, including quali- 
ty, selection, and price, that make them more or less attrac- 
tive to customers. In general, organizations that produce 
goods and services that are more attractive than those pro- 
duced by their otherwise similar competitors are likely to be 
winners in head-to-head competition for customers in local 
markets (Greve, 1996). As a result, organizations with a rela- 
tive edge in product and service offerings will be able to 
maintain their status quo, while losers must differentiate 
themselves and seek alternatives. We hypothesize: 
H4: Organizations that have disadvantages in services and products 
relative to local market competitors are more likely to make diver- 
gent changes. 
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The Role of Institutional Forces 
Organizations face strong, heterogeneous, institutional forces 
to the extent that their external environments consist of influ- 
ential but diverse regulations, norms, and cognitive models 
(Scott, 1995). Divergent organizational change occurs, by def- 
inition, when an organization abandons an institutionalized 
template. Such change is possible when an organizational 
field has heterogeneous institutional elements that are incon- 
sistent with the dominant model; these conditions give orga- 
nizations some discretion-they are less locked in to their 
current templates (Oliver, 1991, 1992). Thus, heterogeneity in 
institutional elements can play a role in promoting divergent 
change that is primarily complementary to the role of local 
markets: while local market forces motivate organizations to 
find alternative templates, heterogeneity in institutional ele- 
ments makes these searches acceptable and successful. 
Heterogeneity in institutional elements is more likely to occur 
to the extent that an organizational field has a fragmented 
structure of decision making, in which there are multiple and 
uncoordinated sources of authority and influence (Scott and 
Meyer, 1983: 141-143; Meyer, Scott, and Strang, 1987). 
Such fields can produce diverse and even competing regula- 
tions, norms, and cognitive models for organizations because 
actors pursue their interests relatively independently, and 
there is no central authority to coordinate their activities or 
settle disputes. For example, two federal agencies may work 
independently in the same organizational field and, as a 
result, produce rules for state-level organizations that conflict 
with each other (e.g., Hoffman, 1999). When influential 
actors throughout a field promote a variety of regulations, 
norms, and cognitive models, an important result is a relative- 
ly wide range of accepted organizational practices and tem- 
plates (Scott and Meyer, 1983: 150-151; Friedland and 
Alford, 1991; Powell, 1991: 195; Greenwood and Hinings, 
1996; Hoffman, 1999). In such fields, organizations that are 
motivated to make divergent changes due to market pres- 
sures have the opportunity to do so, even if it means that 
they are abandoning a template that had been institutional- 
ized across the field (Oliver, 1991, 1992; Ocasio, 1995). Due 
to lack of central control or coordination in heterogeneous 
institutional environments, however, regulative, normative, 
and cognitive elements each play an independent and distinc- 
tive role in influencing divergent organizational change (Scott, 
1995). 
Regulative Elements 
Because regulations often codify widely held beliefs and 
stem from government initiatives, they can be viewed as 
institutional forces (Carroll, Delacroix, and Goodstein, 1988; 
Edelman and Suchman, 1997). Regulatory elements, espe- 
cially government policies, either promote or inhibit divergent 
change by influencing resource flows in markets and organi- 
zations (Wade, Swaminathan, and Saxon, 1998) and by 
requiring organizational accountability in exchange for 
resources (Edelman and Suchman, 1997). Regulatory policies 
promote divergent change, for example, by increasing market 
competition (e.g., Dobbin and Dowd, 1997) and by reducing 
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government financial support for organizational templates 
(e.g., Singh, Tucker, and Meinhard, 1991). In contrast, regula- 
tory policies inhibit divergent change by demanding account- 
ability and reliability from organizations, thus creating routines 
that promote inertia (Hannan and Freeman, 1984). Govern- 
ment policies can thus produce contradictory effects on 
divergent change. 
Regulation that creates inertia. Meyer and Rowan (1977) 
emphasized that organizations whose technologies are rela- 
tively weak and whose output cannot be easily evaluated in 
market exchanges are subject to strong rules that focus on 
controlling their production processes. Such organizational 
fields have regulations that create and reinforce routines and 
structures that are intended to make organizations reliable 
and accountable for their performance. Organizations that fail 
to conform to such regulations risk losing their legitimacy and 
external support (D'Aunno, Sutton, and Price, 1991; Ruef and 
Scott, 1998). Conforming to such regulations, however, may 
be costly. A central argument in structural inertia theory (Han- 
nan and Freeman, 1984) is that, over time, routines reduce 
an organization's ability to change. Similarly, neo-institutional 
theorists argue that routines can become taken for granted, 
thus contributing to inertia (Zucker, 1977). We expect: 
H5: Organizations that meet regulatory requirements in their fields 
are less likely to make divergent changes. 
Legislation that promotes and limits competition. Govern- 
ment regulation and policy also affect divergent change by 
increasing or decreasing the level of competition that organi- 
zations face in local markets (Fligstein, 1996). Strong compe- 
tition motivates organizations to consider divergent change, 
while weak competition makes such change unnecessary. 
Government policy promotes competition through antitrust 
laws that aim to prevent or break up monopolies among 
existing firms (Dobbin and Dowd, 1997). For example, laws 
may reduce barriers to entry so that firms that are new to a 
market can challenge established ones (Fligstein, 1990; Kelly 
and Amburgey, 1991; Dobbin and Dowd, 1997). In contrast, 
policies can weaken competition by regulating several 
aspects of markets, including the production of goods and 
services, prices, and labor wages. The effect of such anti- 
competition policies is to reduce organizations' uncertainty 
about resources and provide them with a stable market envi- 
ronment, thus reinforcing the viability of current templates 
and decreasing the need to make divergent changes (Flig- 
stein, 1996). We hypothesize: 
H6a: Pro-competition regulation will promote divergent organization- 
al change. 
H6b: Anti-competitive regulation will inhibit divergent organizational 
change. 
Legislation that affects resources in local markets. Govern- 
ment regulation and policies also play a contradictory role in 
divergent change by either limiting or increasing resources 
(especially capital) for organizations, thus either increasing or 
decreasing both their need and ability to search for, and 
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implement, alternative templates (Fligstein, 1996; Dobbin and 
Dowd, 1997; Wade, Swaminathan, and Saxon, 1998). Policies 
inhibit divergent change to the extent that they increase 
resources that flow directly to organizations to support their 
current templates. Dobbin and Dowd (1997) argued, for 
example, that the state of Massachusetts provided so much 
capital support for railroads in the 1 800s that owners' con- 
cerns about competition were mitigated; state and local gov- 
ernments were ready to contribute funds to railroads that 
could not meet their expenses. Policies to increase organiza- 
tions' resources work in a variety of ways, ranging from 
direct grants and loans (as for the Chrysler corporation in the 
1 980s) to legislation that reduces regulatory demands that 
are costly for organizations to meet. In contrast, government 
policies can promote divergent change by providing 
resources and financial incentives intended to stimulate and 
support organizations' searches for and implementation of 
alternative templates. In the post-cold-war era, for example, 
legislative initiatives provided resources to firms in the U.S. 
defense industry that would enable them to make divergent 
changes, thus saving jobs that might be lost due to lack of 
demand for military products. Thus, we expect: 
H7a: Legislation that provides resources to support current organiza- 
tional templates will inhibit divergent organizational change. 
H7b: Legislation that provides resources to support organizations' 
use of alternative templates will promote divergent change. 
Norms and values. From among the many norms and val- 
ues that characterize institutional environments, the most 
important to divergent organizational change are those that 
make such change acceptable to actors who own and govern 
organizations. These actors have the authority and power to 
make divergent change occur. Norms about property rights 
are critical because they not only specify who owns organiza- 
tional assets (public vs. private ownership) but also shape the 
extent to which these owners can, and will, use these assets 
to make divergent changes (Campbell and Lindberg, 1990). 
Similarly, norms about governance are critical because they 
specify which actors, other than owners, will influence strate- 
gic decisions, such as those to engage in divergent change 
(Fligstein, 1996). Divergent change is more likely to occur if it 
is supported by an organization's owners and board mem- 
bers, who have the authority and power to make substantial 
changes in an organizational template (Selznick, 1949). 
Norms about property rights define who owns or has claims 
on firms' assets and profits (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; 
Fama, 1980). The more that property rights in an organiza- 
tional field consist of public rather than private ownership of 
firm assets, the less likely it is that divergent organizational 
change will occur. Public ownership means that all citizens of 
a given community, state, or nation have legal claims on an 
organization's assets and profits; these citizens also hold 
responsibility for financial losses. Thus, public ownership dif- 
fuses both the costs and benefits of organizational perfor- 
mance and, as a result, creates inertia rather than support for 
change (Meyer and Zucker, 1990). Further, publicly owned 
organizations typically are founded to meet certain communi- 
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ty needs that profit-seeking organizations have failed to 
address. These organizations thus find it difficult to use pub- 
lic assets for purposes other than those stated in their origi- 
nal charter. Private non-profit organizations have a similar role 
in our society. 
In contrast, for-profit owners have the right to use profits and 
assets as they see fit. In fact, for-profit owners have a legal 
responsibility to protect assets, regardless of prior commit- 
ments of these resources. For-profit owners are less con- 
cerned about meeting an organization's mission than they are 
in generating profits. Faced with market pressures, these 
owners will be likely to abandon traditional goals and commit- 
ments and exercise their right to use assets for other busi- 
ness opportunities. Thus, we expect: 
H8: Public and private non-profit organizations are less likely to 
make divergent changes than for-profit organizations. 
Governance norms play an important part in promoting diver- 
gent organizational change because they specify how firms 
should be organized, including what roles superordinate 
authorities, such as boards, should play in decision making 
(Fligstein, 1996). Governance norms that specify central con- 
trol of complex organizations will promote divergent change 
among the various units or divisions that belong to such orga- 
nizations. This is because central control weakens the impor- 
tance, meaning, and identity of subunits, making it possible 
for superordinate authorities to view them as sets of capaci- 
ties that need to be managed for the good of the firm as a 
whole (Davis, Diekmann, and Tinsley, 1994; Douglas, 1986). 
This view increases the chances that divergent change will 
occur in organizational units that face adversity. We hypothe- 
size: 
H9: Organizations that are members of multidivisional firms are 
more likely to make divergent changes. 
Cognitive models of divergent change. Cognitive elements 
promote divergent change by providing models of such 
change for organizational decision makers to imitate. Organi- 
zations that adopt alternative templates provide cognitive 
models of divergent change that spread in an organizational 
field through mimicry. Neo-institutional theorists argue that 
organizations often mimic other organizations' behavior, espe- 
cially under conditions of uncertainty (DiMaggio and Powell, 
1983; Goodrick and Salancik, 1996). Results from several 
empirical studies support the view that mimetic behavior pro- 
motes organizational changes that are similar to the divergent 
change we examine here. Greve (1995, 1996) found evi- 
dence of mimicry in analyses of radio stations that aban- 
doned their strategies and stations that adopted new market 
positions. Similarly, Haveman (1993) showed that savings and 
loan associations imitated the strategies of large and prof- 
itable associations by entering new markets. Divergent 
change occurs in part because organizations with similar 
resource needs cannot easily co-exist in the same markets. 
Thus, an organization is not likely to imitate other organiza- 
tions that make divergent changes in its local market area 
because the need for such change is greatly reduced when 
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Managed care is now the most predomi- 
nant approach to controlling health care 
costs in the U.S. (Scott et al., 2000), but 
in the time period studied here, especially 
in rural areas, managed care was not yet 
an important market influence. In 1991, 
for example, only 3.5 percent of the pop- 
ulation residing in rural counties was cov- 
ered by managed care. 
neighbors have already made it (Greve, 1995). Rather, organi- 
zations will imitate other organizations that face a similar or 
equivalent pattern of market and institutional forces (Burt, 
1987, 1992). For example, an organization that faced state 
policies that were similar to those of a focal organization, and 
responded with a divergent change, would provide a relevant 
model for such change. In this case, imitation could be highly 
pragmatic (Kraatz and Moore, 1998). Thus, we hypothesize: 
H10: Organizations are more likely to make divergent changes to 
the extent that they have nonlocal models of such change in organi- 
zations that faced similar market and institutional forces. 
Divergent Change among Rural Hospitals 
Institutional pressures. The health care field in the U.S. has 
long been characterized by institutional pressures that are 
both strong and heterogeneous (Stevens, 1989). All branches 
of the federal government make decisions that affect the 
entire health care field. Local and state governments also 
exercise authority to regulate health care providers (Carroll, 
Delacroix, and Goodstein, 1988). This fragmented structure 
of authority makes it possible for various actors to pass laws 
to meet particular needs and, importantly, means that regula- 
tions are, at best, uncoordinated and, at worst, inconsistent 
or conflicting (Alexander and Scott, 1984). This study focuses 
on rural hospitals because rural communities place particular- 
ly strong institutional pressures on their hospitals. If a rural 
hospital closes or changes its mix of services, community 
members may lose access to vital health care services. Rural 
hospitals also are often their communities' major employers; 
their failure may mean the loss of jobs and income for the 
community. Finally, hospitals have important symbolic mean- 
ing in rural communities; they are a source of pride that 
erodes with hospital closure or identity changes. 
Effect of Medicare cuts. The 1980s marked the beginning of 
a new era that shifted focus from increasing access to health 
care, as marked by the passage of Medicare and Medicaid 
legislation in the 1960s, to controlling costs (Scott et al., 
2000). Several years of double-digit increases in prices threat- 
ened the economic interests of actors who pay for health 
care; in response, they initiated policies and practices to con- 
trol costs.1 In 1984, Medicare became the first major payer 
to try to control hospital costs by moving from paying all 
"usual and reasonable" fees that hospitals charged for a par- 
ticular service to paying a fixed fee for each service. This key 
change in Medicare payment policy had significant financial 
and market effects for rural hospitals (Bazzoli, 1995). Hospi- 
tals received reduced cash payments for services, which cut 
their budgets and contributed to cash-flow problems. Hospi- 
tals tried to compensate by increasing their patient and ser- 
vice volume, which, in turn, created more competition for 
patients. Though market pressures might have been relative- 
ly low in rural health care prior to 1984, these pressures 
increased with Medicare reform. 
Rural hospital conversion as divergent organizational 
change. Rural hospital conversion occurs when a rural com- 
munity hospital leaves the defining business of hospitals- 
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2 
Nonetheless, we could test all of the 
other hypotheses with this sample (i.e., 
H1 and H5-H10), and we did so to deter- 
mine if excluding hospitals with no com- 
petitors within 35 miles affected the 
results. Including these rural hospitals (an 
average of 362 per year) increased the 
sample size for the hospital-year data 
from 14,446 to 17,280. The results (avail- 
able from the authors) do not differ signif- 
icantly from those obtained when the 
sample excludes rural hospitals with no 
competitors within 35 miles. 
Divergent Change 
acute inpatient care-and converts all of its capacity to 
become a provider of other kinds of health care, either outpa- 
tient care (e.g., ambulatory care clinic) or specialty inpatient 
care (e.g., nursing homes) (Alexander, D'Aunno, and Succi, 
1996). Rural hospital conversion is a divergent organizational 
change for several reasons. First, conversion means that the 
"hospital" template is discontinued. The hospital template 
consists of two distinctive capacities: (1) to perform certain 
technical, medical procedures and (2) to allow patients to 
recover from acute episodes of health problems or proce- 
dures for a short stay (up to several days). Conversion 
changes one or both of these core features. The capacity to 
perform technical medical procedures (all surgical proce- 
dures) is lost when a hospital converts entirely to either a 
long-term care facility (a nursing home) or to a provider of 
non-acute care, such as mental health or drug abuse treat- 
ment. The capacity to allow short stays of residential care is 
lost when a hospital converts entirely to an outpatient care 
provider. To eliminate the physicians, technology, and ser- 
vices that define a hospital is a radical change, not just an 
incremental one, as is involved when a hospital specializes, 
for example, by using some beds to provide long-term care 
for the elderly. 
Second, the hospital template has been highly institutional- 
ized across the entire health care field for decades (Stevens, 
1989). In all states, for an organization that provides health 
care to be termed a hospital it must meet certain legislatively 
defined standards, such as having the capacity to provide 
care by licensed professionals for 24 hours per day, having 
state-licensed physicians and equipment to perform surgery, 
or operating an emergency unit for 24 hours per day with at 
least one physician staff member. Eliminating the services 
and medical staff that define a "hospital" means that a 
health care provider is legally no longer a hospital. Finally, 
when the required services and medical staff that define a 
hospital are eliminated, other groups recognize that the iden- 
tity of the hospital has changed. 
METHOD 
Sample 
This study's unit of analysis is the individual hospital. The 
study sample consisted of all non-specialty, community hos- 
pitals that were at risk for divergent change (conversion) dur- 
ing the study period. These included hospitals operating in 
rural areas from 1984 through 1991 and those hospitals that 
were founded during the study period or that may have exit- 
ed the population of rural hospitals through mergers and con- 
solidations. We used the broadest possible definition of rural: 
any locale outside a metropolitan statistical area (MSA). The 
sample excluded hospitals that operated in rural areas at the 
outset of the study period but were subsequently incorporat- 
ed into an MSA. The sample also excluded rural hospitals 
that had no competitors within 35 miles; we could not test 
hypotheses about local market competition with these isolat- 
ed hospitals.2 The final study sample consisted of 2,064 rural 
hospitals. 
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Data Sources 
We used several data sources. The American Hospital Asso- 
ciation (AHA) annual survey data files (1984-1991) provided 
an initial listing of conversions as well as data on hospital ser- 
vices and organizational characteristics. We collected primary 
data from state hospital associations and individual hospitals 
and medical facilities to validate our initial inventory of con- 
versions. We used the Area Resource File (ARF) (Bureau of 
Health Professions, 1991) as a source of data on county-level 
market variables. We used latitude and longitude listing of all 
community hospital addresses from Geographic Inc. to com- 
pute straight-line distances between each hospital in the 
sample and the nearest hospital provider (rural or urban). The 
Health Care Financing Administration (HCFA) Medicare Cost 
reports (1 984-1991) provided data for computing financial 
ratios for all federally funded hospitals in the sample. Data on 
state legislation concerning rural hospitals came from the 
Intergovernmental Health Policy Project (1988) and Gibbens 
and Ludtke (1990). 
We merged data from these sources to construct a pooled, 
cross-sectional analysis file. The data set contained annual 
observations on hospitals from 1984 through 1991 in a hospi- 
tal-year format. Hospitals in the sample were assigned obser- 
vations for all variables for each year of the study period. 
Those hospitals that entered the sample after 1984 or exited 
prior to 1991 were assigned observations only for the years 
they were operational during the study period. Because pre- 
dictors of hospital conversion were unlikely to exercise 
instantaneous effects, and to enhance causal explanation, all 
predictors were lagged by one year in the analysis. Thus, the 
data set consisted of seven years of observations, equivalent 
to 14,446 hospital-years. Table 1 shows the measures for all 
study variables. 
Dependent Variable 
Conversion means that a rural hospital changed to provide 
other types of health care services, and these included outpa- 
tient facilities and specialized inpatient facilities (long-term 
care, substance abuse). We classified community hospitals 
that closed but reopened as health care providers within one 
year of closure as conversions. This decision assumes that 
conversions are often not instantaneous events but require 
changing the hospital to fulfill its new role. If the time span 
from closure to reopening as a health care facility was 
greater than one year, however, the event was classified as a 
closure. We used a two-step process to produce a complete, 
validated inventory of conversion in the population of rural 
hospitals over the study period. First, we compiled an initial 
inventory of conversion events by comparing annual changes 
in hospital status using the AHA annual surveys (1984-1991). 
Second, representatives in all 50 state hospital associations 
reviewed and modified this preliminary inventory of events. 
We found 147 rural hospital conversions. Seven percent of 
the hospitals converted to become providers of long-term 
care (nursing homes); 17 percent became specialty providers 
of inpatient care (substance abuse); and the majority of hospi- 
tals, 76 percent, converted to become outpatient clinics that 
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Table 1 
Variables and Their Measures* 
Variable Measure 
Conversion Rural community hospital ceases operation and, within one year, begins opera- 
tion as another type of health care provider (1 = yes; 0 = no) 
Market position 
Geographic proximity Straight-line distance (in miles) from focal rural hospital to nearest hospital in its 
market area 
Relative position by: Euclidean distance between a focal hospital and other hospitals in its market, 
based on: 
Size Total number of beds authorized and staffed 
Diagnostic service 8-item scale: CT scanner; cardiac catheterization lab; diagnostic radioisotope; X- 
ray radiation; megavoltage radiation; trauma center; hospice; psychological hospi- 
talization 
Inpatient treatment 8-item scale: respiratory therapy; pediatric acute care; obstetric care; physical 
therapy; cardiac intensive care; general medical/surgical care; medical/surgical 
intensive care; ultrasound 
Outpatient services 5-item scale: ambulatory surgery; psychiatric emergency; psychiatric treatment; 
substance abuse; rehabilitation 
Demand 
Total population Average population of focal hospital and contiguous counties, in 1,000s 
Population age Percent of population age 65 or older in focal and contiguous counties 
Population income Per capita income in focal and contiguous counties 
Regulatory elements (state or federal legislation) 
Capital funds for rural hospitals Hospital is located in a state with laws that provide capital funds to maintain 
rural hospitals (1 = yes; 0 = no) 
Reduction in regulation to reduce Hospital is located in a state with law to reduce regulations that 
operating expenses place financial burdens on rural hospitals (1 = yes; 0 = no) 
Capital for rural hospital conversion Hospital is located in a state with law that provides capital for rural hospital con- 
version (1 = yes; 0 = no) 
Certificate-of-Need law (CON) 5-item index: CON covers capital expenditures; CON covers medical equipment 
purchases; CON covers new services; percentage of hospital requests approved 
by CON review board; budget size for CON review board; each item ranked from 
0 (no CON) to 3 (most stringent requirements) and summed; index ranges from 
0 (no CON) to 15 (most extensive regulation) 
JCAHO accreditation Hospital has JCAHO accreditation (2 = yes); (1 = no) 
Diversification law Hospital is located in state with law that reduces barriers to entry in new ser- 
vices or geographic service areas (1 = yes; 0 = no) 
Normative elements 
Multihospital system member Hospital is member of multihospital system, defined as two or more hospitals 
that are owned, leased, or sponsored by a single administrative entity (1 = yes; 
o = no) 
Ownership Hospital ownership is public (1 = yes; 0 = no), private-for-profit (1 = yes; 0 = no); 
private non-profit is an omitted category 
Cognitive element 
Conversion available as a model Rate of rural hospital conversion in focal hospital's state 
Cash flow Ratio of net income plus depreciation divided by total assets 
Size Number of beds set up and staffed for use 
Age Number of years since hospital's founding 
Time The years 1985-1991 are measured as a series of dummy variables, with 1991 
as the omitted reference year 
*AII variables are measured for each year of the study period. 
provide primary health care. The number of new conversions 
per year was 10 in 1984; 10 in 1985; 18 in 1986; 20 in 1987; 
24 in 1988; 24 in 1989; 21 in 1990; and 20 in 1991. 
Predictor Variables 
Market area. Following Succi, Lee, and Alexander (1997), we 
defined local market areas for rural hospitals using a variable- 
radius approach. The variable-radius approach takes into 
account that local market areas vary for each rural hospital on 
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the basis of population density (generally considered in the 
literature as a measure for service demand) in areas sur- 
rounding the focal hospital (Goody, 1993; Phibbs and Robin- 
son, 1993). Population density was calculated by averaging 
the total number of residents per square mile for the focal 
county and all contiguous counties (Bronstein and Morrisey, 
1990). Thus, hospitals located in areas with lower population 
density were assigned a larger radius and a larger market 
area than hospitals in areas with higher population density. 
To calculate a radius for each hospital's market area, we limit- 
ed radii to a range between 10 and 35 miles. We selected 
the 10-mile lower bound because it represents the average 
of two distances (1 5 and 5 miles) generally considered as the 
radii of urban hospital markets (Luft and Maerki, 1984). The 
35-mile upper bound was selected because it represents the 
cut-off by which rural hospitals are designated as a sole com- 
munity hospital (Office of Technology Assessment, 1990). 
Within these bounds, we assigned each rural hospital a 
radius value between 10 and 35 miles, using two steps. First, 
we determined the market area for each rural hospital by cal- 
culating a weight for population density in the focal hospital's 
county and surrounding counties; this weight is relative to 
the total population of rural hospitals. Next, we used this 
weight to assign a proportionate radius for each rural hospi- 
tal, according to the following equation from Succi, Lee, and 
Alexander (1997): 
R2 - (10)2 P 
- 
P 
f_  _ _ __ _ _ _ f m ax 
(35)2 _ (1 0)2 Pmin - Pmax 
where Rf is the radius of the focal hospital's market area; Pf 
is the average population density in the focal hospital's home 
county and surrounding counties; Pmax is the highest value of 
average population density in the sample; and Pmin is the low- 
est value of average population density in the sample. The 
resulting market areas formed the basis for constructing 
measures of local market demand and market position. 
Demand. Demand for hospital services was measured by 
three variables: population and percent of population age 65 
or older are measures of general demand for hospital ser- 
vices (i.e., potential patients); aging increases the need for 
and use of such services. Per capita income reflects the gen- 
eral munificence of the market and the ability of the popula- 
tion to afford hospital services. We constructed these 
demand measures by averaging the values of the focal and 
contiguous counties to account for services provided for 
patients from neighboring counties. 
Market position. We measured three aspects of each rural 
hospital's market position: geographic proximity to the near- 
est hospital, service mix relative to its market competitors, 
and size relative to market competitors. Because of sparse 
populations and the small number of competitors in most 
rural markets, we considered proximity a better measure of 
the potential for competition than more traditional measures 
such as market density or concentration. We focus on the 
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relative number of different services that rural hospitals pro- 
vide because, other things being equal, patients and their 
physicians prefer to do "one-stop shopping" at hospitals that 
provide a rich array of services (Succi, Lee, and Alexander, 
1997). Rural hospitals with a larger, richer mix of services rel- 
ative to competitors should have an advantage. We produced 
scales that measured the relative number of services that 
hospitals provide in three areas: diagnostic, inpatient, and 
outpatient services. We began with the list of services that 
appeared consistently in the AHA survey for each year of the 
study, asked several health care experts to group these ser- 
vices into common domains (if any), and conducted statistical 
checks on the resulting scales. We used multidimensional 
scaling (MDS) to group the service items because they are 
binary: a hospital had a particular service or not (Kruskal and 
Wish, 1978). We also used confirmatory factor analysis to 
check the results from MDS. Cronbach alpha tests show 
acceptable reliability scores (diagnostic services = .67; inpa- 
tient services = .63; outpatient services = .65), and there are 
low correlations among the scales. 
We calculated relative competitive advantage due to service 
mix and size using a variant of the Euclidean distance to indi- 
cate how much an individual hospital differed from other hos- 
pitals in its market (Jackson et al., 1991): 
n 
Si - Si 
j=1 n -1' 
where n is the number of hospitals in a market, Si is the focal 
hospital's value on size or services, and Si is the jth hospital's 
value on the corresponding attribute. This measure differs 
from the standard Euclidean distance score: it reflects the 
direction of the difference and whether the focal hospital was 
positioned above or below the market average. We could 
thus use these measures to test our hypotheses about the 
relative competitive advantages of size and service mix. 
Regulation. Using data from the Intergovernmental Health 
Policy Project (1988), Gibbens and Ludtke (1990), and the 
AHA survey, we measured six types of federal and state reg- 
ulation during each year of the study period (see table 1). To 
test H5 on the effects of conformity to regulations, we mea- 
sured whether each rural hospital held an accreditation from 
the Joint Commission on Health Care Organizations (JCAHO). 
This accreditation is the field's primary regulatory approach to 
increase reliability in the production of hospital services 
(Westphal, Gulati, and Shortell, 1997; Ruef and Scott, 1998). 
To test H6a, we measured pro-competition legislation that 
focused on rural hospitals in the 1980s, intended to promote 
competition by reducing or eliminating regulatory barriers to 
entry into new markets. Several states encouraged hospitals 
to diversify into nontraditional services (e.g., nursing homes). 
This legislation assumed that diversification would enable 
rural hospitals to convert to provide more financially viable 
(less expensive) services. To test H6b, we assessed the 
strength of states' anti-competition regulation by the strength 
of Certificate of Need laws, which are a key anti-competition 
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regulation in this field. Certificate of Need laws restrict the 
purchase of new equipment and construction because they 
require hospitals to demonstrate medical need for each capi- 
tal expense. Hospitals competing to attract patients often 
purchase new medical technology, build facilities, and begin 
new service programs. In response to such non-price compe- 
tition, many states passed Certificate of Need laws in the 
1970s. These laws limit competition for technology and serve 
as a barrier to entry to new products and services. We used 
a five-item index of Certificate of Need laws that measures 
variance in both their breadth and stringency. Three of the 
five dimensions measure the breadth of Certificate of Need 
laws (i.e., what services or capital expenditures are covered 
by the law). Stringency is measured in that each of the five 
dimensions is rated on a scale from 0 to 3, on which 0 indi- 
cates that the law did not cover a dimension (e.g., new ser- 
vices were not regulated), and 3 indicates that the law was 
most stringent (e.g., capital purchases of less that $150,000 
must be approved by a review board). Values for the five 
dimensions were summed to create an index that ranges 
from 0 to 15. This measure was available only for 1986, but 
these regulations changed very little in the study period. 
We measured two types of state legislation to test H7a on 
the effects of state intervention to support current templates. 
Several states passed legislation to provide low-interest loans 
for rural hospitals to purchase capital equipment (e.g., 
advanced diagnostic technology) that might attract patients 
(Mueller, 1992). Such capital fund laws sought to inhibit diver- 
gent change among rural hospitals by providing them with 
funds needed to maintain their current work. Some states 
passed legislation to reduce the regulatory burden on rural 
hospitals and thus indirectly improve their financial status; for 
example, a requirement for continuous physician coverage 
could be met by having a physician on call rather than on 
site. Finally, we used one measure of state legislation to test 
H7b on the effects of state intervention in promoting diver- 
gent change. Several states passed legislation to provide 
rural hospitals with capital that would enable them to move 
from providing acute inpatient care to sub-acute care exclu- 
sively, i.e., only outpatient care or long-term care (e.g., nurs- 
ing homes). 
Norms. To measure the effects of norms concerning property 
rights and governance (H8 and H9), we included two vari- 
ables in the model: hospital ownership and hospital member- 
ship in a multihospital system. We measured hospital owner- 
ship by a series of dummy variables representing private 
for-profit, public (state or local government), and private not- 
for-profit ownership. Membership in a multihospital system is 
a measure of norms specifying system-level, centralized gov- 
ernance vs. local governance of a hospital. Multihospital sys- 
tem membership was measured with a dummy variable, 
where 1 = yes, and 0 = no. 
Cognitive models. To measure the availability of nonlocal 
models of divergent change for a focal hospital to imitate 
(H10), we calculated the rate of rural hospital conversion in 
each state. Rural hospitals that have converted in a given 
state provide an especially likely role model for other hospi- 
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tals in that state because so much health care regulation is 
state-specific. 
Control variables. Prior work suggests that three important 
characteristics of hospitals could affect their responses to 
institutional and market forces: cash flow, size, and age. Cash 
flow was used to assess hospital financial performance, 
which, if poor, could provide either a stimulus for change 
(e.g., Tushman and Romanelli, 1985) or a stimulus that 
induces rigidity and inertia (e.g., Staw, Sandelands, and Dut- 
ton, 1981; Ocasio, 1995). The measure of cash flow we used 
is appropriate for rural hospitals because it captures both 
profits earned and cash-based activities (Kane, 1991). Other 
financial indicators are more sensitive to profits earned and 
tend to present difficulties for comparisons among hospitals 
of different ownership and for rural hospitals when equity bal- 
ances are negative. 
Following structural inertia theory (Baum, 1996), we exam- 
ined the effects of organization age and size on divergent 
change; older and larger organizations might be less likely to 
engage in divergent change. Our measure of size, number of 
beds set up and staffed for use, has the advantage of captur- 
ing the actual number of beds that hospitals are using, as 
opposed to the number of beds they are licensed to use. We 
measured age as the number of years since the hospital's 
founding. Table 2 shows means, standard deviations, and cor- 
relations for all study variables. 
Model Estimation 
We used discrete-time event history analysis (McCullagh and 
Nelder, 1983), which can be used to estimate the rate of 
occurrence for a particular event, compared with all non- 
event observations (e.g., conversion versus non-conversions). 
Discrete-time event history analysis offers two other advan- 
tages. First, it adjusts for right-censored observations: obser- 
vations that were truncated due to merger and those that 
continued to operate as community hospitals after the end of 
the study period (Yamaguchi, 1991). Second, this approach is 
appropriate for use with time-varying covariates and categori- 
cal dependent variables that might produce specification error 
if modeled with linear regression techniques. 
To assess the effects of time on risk of rural hospital conver- 
sion, we included a series of dummy variables representing 
each year of the study in the model. Interactions between 
these dummy variables and all other covariates were added 
to the model to test the assumption that effects of covari- 
ates on conversion are time-invariant. Results (not shown) 
indicate that time interactions were not statistically signifi- 
cant. Because these findings suggest that covariate effects 
were not dependent on history, time-covariate interaction 
terms were subsequently excluded from the model. 
Adjustments for repeated observations. Longitudinal data 
consisting of repeated observations of the covariates and 
outcomes for the same subjects can introduce bias due to 
correlation among the repeated observations (Zeger and 
Liang, 1986). We used generalized estimating equations 
(GEE) to estimate the modeJ to correct for potential bias 
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Table 2 
Descriptive Statistics and Zero-order Correlations* 
Variable Mean S.D. 1 2 
1. Conversion .01 0.08 
2. Bed size 83.80 66.61 -.03 
3. Hospital age 42.80 23.30 -.01 .26 
4. Cash flow .07 0.24 -.08 .08 
5. Distance to near hosp. 15.28 7.34 -.03 -.24 
6. Relative size -8.05 78.21 -.03 .71 
7. Inpatient services -.02 E-2 1 .65 -.02 .15 
8. Diagnostic services -.09 1.30 -.04 .49 
9. Outpatient services -.08 1 .48 -.02 .37 
10. Total pop. (1,000s) 418.15 527.44 .02 .09 
11. % population > 65 14.10 8.80 .00 .34 
12. Per capita income 12220 2360 .01 -.08 
13. Capital funds for hosp. .32 0.47 .00 -.01 
14. Capital for conversion .05 0.22 .03 .01 
15. CON law 7.23 3.49 -.02 .18 
16. JCAHO 1.38 0.48 -.03 .41 
17. Diversification law .08 0.28 .00 .02 
18. Reduced regulation .13 0.34 .02 -.15 
19. MHS member .37 0.48 .03 -.01 
20. Public ownership .42 0.49 -.02 -.20 
21. Private for-profit .09 0.29 .01 .00 
22. Conversion rate .05 0.07 .03 -.04 
Variable 11 12 13 14 
12. Per capita income .02 
13. Capital funds for hosp. -.04 -.1 1 
14. Capital for conversion -.03 .20 -.1 0 
15. CON law .03 -.16 -.15 .12 
16. JCAHO .18 -.05 -.03 .01 
17. Diversification law -.05 .09 -.09 .22 
18. Reduced regulation .02 .19 .32 .02 
19. MHS member .07 .01 -.05 .05 
20. Public ownership -.18 .00 .15 -.02 
21. Private for-profit .03 -.14 .07 -.03 
22. Conversion rate -.02 .11 .10 .14 
*Correlations greater than .016 or less than -.016 are significant at p <.05; N = 14,446 
hospital years. 
caused by such correlation (Karim and Zeger, 1988). GEE 
adjusts for repeated observations by estimating within-sub- 
ject correlation separately from the regression parameters, 
yielding consistent estimates of the regression coefficients 
without rigorous assumptions about the actual correlation 
among the subjects' observations (Zeger and Liang, 1986). 
RESULTS 
Table 3 shows results from event history analyses using GEE 
to test our hypotheses. It shows results from four equations 
that enter variables in different combinations to determine 
the extent to which coefficients are affected by other vari- 
ables in the equation. In column one are results from an 
equation with only the control variables; column two shows 
results from an equation with control variables and market 
variables; in column three are results with control variables 
and institutional variables, and, finally, column four shows 
results from an equation with all variables. Because the 
results change so little from one equation to the next, we 
focus on results from the full model (column 4). 
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3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
.00 
-.14 -.03 
.16 .06 -.09 
.08 .06 -.02 .20 
.17 .08 -.09 .67 .26 
.12 .06 -.07 .51 .20 .49 
.13 -.01 -.21 -.02 -.01 -.02 -.02 
.12 .06 -.16 .32 .13 .31 .25 -.24 
.18 -.06 .09 -.01 -.01 .00 -.01 .13 
-.07 -.03 -.03 .01 -.01 .00 .00 .00 
.08 -.02 .07 .01 -.01 .01 .00 .10 
.06 .05 -.07 .00 .01 .02 .00 .02 
.23 .07 -.20 .21 .19 .26 .18 .20 
.06 -.01 -.07 -.01 .00 -.02 .00 .20 
-.07 -.07 .09 .00 -.01 -.01 .00 -.1 1 
-.02 .00 -.02 -.01 .04 .01 .01 .02 
-.20 -.03 .19 -.06 -.04 -.10 -.07 -.08 
-.15 .04 -.16 -.05 -.05 -.02 -.02 .03 
.00 -.04 .02 -.00 .00 -.01 .00 .05 
15 16 17 18 19 20 21 
.13 
.02 -.08 
-.47 .17 -.12 
-.05 -.13 .02 .03 
-.15 .24 -.02 .10 -.23 
.01 -.04 .02 .02 .26 -.27 
.15 -.01 .04 .22 .01 -.01 .00 
Market Forces 
There is no support for H1, that organizations operating in 
local markets with lower demand levels would be more likely 
to engage in divergent change (see columns 2 and 4). None 
of the demand measures (population in the area, percent of 
population over age 65, per capita income in the market) 
were significantly related to divergent change. Results do 
support H2, that the closer the geographic distance between 
an organization and its closest competitor, the more likely it is 
that a focal organization would make a divergent change. 
There is a statistically significant relationship between geo- 
graphic distance to a competitor and hospital conversion. 
Odds ratios show that there is an 8 percent decrease in the 
likelihood of conversion for each mile that hospitals are locat- 
ed from each other. Hospitals that are located 20 miles from 
each other are 80 percent less likely to convert than hospitals 
that are located 10 miles from each other. H3, that divergent 
change would be more likely for organizations that had size 
disadvantages (were smaller) relative to market competitors, 
was not supported. There was only partial support for H4, 
that organizations would be more likely to engage in diver- 
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Table 3 
Results from Discrete lime Event History Analyses Using GEE: 
Market and Institutional Effects on Divergent Change among Rural Hospitals* 
Predictor variable 1 2 3 4 
Intercept -4.33 -3.97* -5.00w -3.83w 
(.357) (.876) (.666) (.613) 
Bed size -.009" -.0100 -.006 -.0070 
(.003) (.004) (.003) (.004) 
Age -.001 -.001 -.001 -.001 
(.005) (.005) (.005) (.005) 
Cash flow -1.28w -1.29w -1.21w -1.27o 
(.341) (.367) (.362) (.377) 
Distance to nearest hospital -.080 -.085rn 
(.019) (.020) 
Relative bed size .002 .000 
(.004) (.002) 
Diagnostic services -.3460 -.318" 
(.142) (.138) 
Inpatient services -.049 -.040 
(.069) (.069) 
Outpatient services -.006 -.008 
(.112) (.109) 
Total population .000 .000 
(.0001) (.001) 
Percent population >65 .001 .004 
(.015) (.015) 
Per capita income .000 .000 
(.0001) (.0001) 
Capital funds for rural hospitals -.088 -.188 
(.248) (.257) 
Capital funds for conversion .906-- 1.04" 
(.360) (.612) 
Reduction in regulation -.203 -.028 
(.320) (.339) 
CON law -.0830 -.0900 
(.037) (.041) 
JCAHO accreditation -.5790 -.6570 
(.258) (.242) 
Diversification law .045 -.241 
(.379) (.414) 
Multihospital member .511 Gil .591 Gi 
(.231) (.228) 
Public ownership -.6920 -.6050 
(.248) (.259) 
Private for-profit -.007 -.412 
(.356) (.386) 
Conversion rate in state 3.30 3.370 
(1.59) (1.61) 
1985 -1.27 -1.11 1.11 -1.12 
(.659) (.675) (.668) (.690) 
1986 -.393 -.273 -.221 -.316 
(.416) (.463) (.441) (.490) 
1987 .040 .139 .125 .043 
(.367) (.406) (.379) (.418) 
1988 .098 .155 .206 .120 
(.355) (.357) (.364) (.367) 
1989 .083 .153 .114 .092 
(.363) (.380) (.374) (.303) 
1990 -.244 -.213 -.248 -.269 
(.401) (.404) (.405) (.409) 
Log-likelihood 61 .32m 1 00.1 6rn 98.1 60 1 39.26 
D.f. 9 17 19 27 
ep < .05; "p < .01; ..p < .001, two-tailed tests. 
*The sample includes 14,446 hospital-years and 147 conversion events. Standard errors are in parentheses. 
gent change to the extent that they had disadvantages in 
product and service mix relative to competitors. Rural hospi- 
tals were more likely to convert if they had a disadvantage 
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relative to their market competitors in providing diagnostic 
services. The results thus provide mixed support for the 
hypothesized role of market forces in promoting divergent 
organizational change. The key market factors that appear to 
promote divergent change are geographic proximity to com- 
petitors and the extent to which an organization has a disad- 
vantage in product or service mix relative to local competi- 
tors. 
Institutional Forces 
H5-H10 concern the role of institutional forces in promoting 
and inhibiting divergent organizational change (see columns 3 
and 4). The results show strong support for H5, that organiza- 
tions that meet major regulatory requirements are less likely 
to make divergent changes. Rural hospitals that meet the 
requirements of JCAHO accreditation are significantly less 
likely to convert (92 percent less likely). H6a, that pro-compe- 
tition legislation (that reduces barriers to entry) would 
increase the likelihood of divergent organizational change, is 
not supported, but the results do support H6b, that anti-com- 
petitive regulation would inhibit divergent organizational 
change. Hospitals located in states with stronger Certificate 
of Need laws are significantly less likely to convert (8 percent 
less likely). H7a, that legislation that provides resources (e.g., 
capital funds) to support current organizational templates will 
inhibit divergent organizational change, was not supported; 
there was no relationship between rural hospital conversion 
and hospitals' location in states that provided capital funds to 
support current organizational templates. Similarly, legislation 
that attempted to reduce operating costs for rural hospitals 
by decreasing the burden of regulations was not related to 
conversion. In contrast, H7b was strongly supported: hospi- 
tals were significantly more likely to convert (2.8 times as 
likely) if they were located in states that passed legislation 
providing capital to do so. We also examined the extent to 
which rural hospitals faced combinations of inconsistent insti- 
tutional elements and found that this occurred relatively 
rarely. For example, in the seven-year study period, only 
three states passed legislation that was both strongly anti- 
competitive and pro-competitive. But there was variation 
between states in the regulations that they passed to influ- 
ence rural hospitals. 
The results show moderate support for H8, that public and 
private non-profit organizations would be less likely to make 
divergent changes than for-profit organizations. Publicly 
owned rural hospitals were significantly less likely to convert 
(46 percent less likely) than private nonprofit rural hospitals. 
Private nonprofit rural hospitals did not differ, however, from 
for-profit hospitals in their likelihood for divergent change. 
The results support H9, showing that members of multihos- 
pital systems are significantly more likely to convert (81 per- 
cent) than free-standing hospitals. Results also provide strong 
support for H10, that organizations are more likely to make 
divergent changes to the extent that they have nonlocal, but 
equivalent models of such change: rural hospitals located in 
states that have higher rates of conversion are more likely to 
convert themselves. In general, the results provide consis- 
tent support for the hypotheses concerning the effects of 
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normative and cognitive institutional elements in divergent 
change, but the results are mixed on the effects of regulation 
on such change. Finally, the results show that two of the 
three control variables are related to divergent change. Hospi- 
tals that were smaller and that had worse financial positions 
were more likely to convert. 
DISCUSSION 
We argued that strong, local market forces limit the critical 
resources that organizations need to support their current 
templates, while strong, heterogeneous institutional forces 
make searches for new templates acceptable and successful. 
In fragmented organizational fields, the regulatory, normative, 
and cognitive elements that typically promote stability in 
behavior can also promote divergent change. The results pro- 
vide relatively strong support for our hypotheses. 
Market factors seem to affect divergent change in two 
important ways. An organization is more likely to engage in 
divergent change to the extent that it (1) is geographically 
proximate to competitors and (2) has a relative competitive 
disadvantage in its product and service mix. These results are 
consistent with results from Baum and Haveman (1997) that 
suggest that founders of hotels try to differentiate their orga- 
nization on at least one key dimension to avoid competition 
with other hotels in close geographic proximity. The issue of 
geographic proximity is particularly salient for service organi- 
zations such as hospitals. When service organizations are 
located in close proximity, potential consumers have choices, 
and this makes it difficult for all competitors to stay in the 
same market. Further, overlap in diagnostic services is impor- 
tant because hospitals that are able to provide these services 
are likely to have an edge in patients' decisions about where 
to receive follow-up treatment services. The importance of 
diagnostic services as a competitive advantage may explain 
why we observe no effects for other measures of organiza- 
tions' advantages in size or product and service mix. Our fail- 
ure to find results for market demand may validate a long- 
standing claim that health care providers are more important 
in creating demand for services than individual consumers 
(Feldstein, 1988). Physicians in particular can create demand 
for hospital services by their decisions about the need for 
such services and where they should be obtained. We tested 
this hypothesis with measures of the per capita number of 
physicians in market areas, but we found no significant 
results (results not shown). Perhaps more fine-grained mea- 
sures are needed to adequately assess demand for hospital 
services and its relationship to divergent change. 
At the same time, it is clear that institutional factors con- 
tribute both to promoting and inhibiting divergent organiza- 
tional change. The results for normative and cognitive ele- 
ments in promoting such change are relatively consistent and 
strong. In contrast, the results for regulatory elements are 
mixed. On the one hand, it appears that regulation that 
makes organizations reliable and accountable for their produc- 
tion processes (JCAHO accreditation) and regulation that 
directly limits competition (Certificate of Need legislation) 
inhibited organizational change, while, in contrast, regulation 
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aimed at promoting change by increasing competition had no 
effects. These results indicate that regulation aimed at main- 
taining the status quo may be more effective than regulation 
that seeks to promote change in markets or organizations. 
On the other hand, the results also show that state interven- 
tion was effective in promoting divergent change when it 
awarded funds directly to organizations to support their 
efforts to find and implement alternative templates. Hospitals 
located in states with legislation that provided capital funds 
to promote conversion were significantly more likely to con- 
vert. Taken together, these results suggest that only relatively 
focused state intervention is effective in promoting divergent 
organizational change. Both JCAHO accreditation and Certifi- 
cate of Need legislation are relatively longstanding in the 
health care field; perhaps the newer legislation needed 
reworking to make it effective. 
We also argued that norms concerning governance and prop- 
erty rights in an organizational field influence divergent 
change (Fligstein, 1996), and the results support this view. 
Hospitals that are members of multihospital systems lose 
local governance. This shift in governance means that the 
interests of individual hospitals become secondary to the 
interests of the system as a whole, which system boards 
have a legal obligation to support. Membership in multihospi- 
tal systems thus makes it more likely that divergent change 
will occur in individual hospitals to meet the needs of their 
parent systems. The results also show that public hospitals 
are less likely to convert than privately owned nonprofit hos- 
pitals. Public hospitals limit owners' property rights-there 
are no profits recognized in publicly owned organizations, and 
taxpayers share both assets and financial losses. Thus, the 
combination of local control and diffuse, public ownership of 
assets and profits makes it very difficult for divergent change 
to occur. These results are consistent with our broader argu- 
ment that institutional elements can either promote or inhibit 
divergent organizational change. 
Finally, we argued that organizations would mimic models of 
divergent change that are provided by their nonlocal, but 
equivalent peers; the results support this view. In states that 
already have high rates of rural hospital conversion, more 
conversion is likely. Organizations are likely to mimic behavior 
that they can observe among peers that face similar institu- 
tional and resource environments (Greve, 1998; Martin, 
Swaminathan, and Mitchell, 1998). 
Despite the relative strength of the results, we are cautious 
about making generalizations from this study. We argued 
above that inconsistent results from the few previous studies 
of divergent change could be due to the particular organiza- 
tional fields that were examined. Following this logic, this 
study's results may hold only for a particular context. We 
examined a fragmented organizational field at a time when 
traditional organizational forms and practices were called into 
question due to the steeply rising costs of health care. It is 
under this combination of conditions that we find that both 
market and institutional forces can promote divergent organi- 
zational change. Further, we examined a relatively brief time 
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period (seven years) in a field with a long and complex histo- 
ry (Starr, 1982; Stevens, 1989). Perhaps our results would 
change over time, as both institutions and markets evolve in 
this field. Thus, we encourage empirical tests of our hypothe- 
ses in other industries that are experiencing profound 
change. 
Nonetheless, despite its limitations, the study results raise 
important questions for research on divergent organizational 
change. One question concerns how divergent change 
affects organizational performance. Though Kraatz and Zajac 
(1996) found no decline in the performance of liberal arts col- 
leges that added professional degree programs to their cur- 
ricula, the change we examined is more extensive. Moreover, 
the change we examined involved organizations moving from 
what ecologists might consider generalists (hospitals) to spe- 
cialists (e.g., nursing homes) (Baum, 1996). To what extent 
do generalists perform well in their new areas of specializa- 
tion? Does this change merely stall organizational demise? 
Further, this study raises questions about the processes 
involved in divergent change. Because we used national sur- 
vey data, we could not examine such processes, as scholars 
had done in the original institutional school (Selznick, 1996). 
Certain approaches to divergent change, such as gaining the 
support of a range of stakeholders, may affect post-change 
performance. 
The results also indicate that institutional theory can provide 
at least a partial account for divergent organizational change. 
This account includes several elements. First, we must rec- 
ognize that organizational fields vary in their structure of deci- 
sion making and in the strength of their institutional and mar- 
ket forces (Dacin, 1997; Hoffman, 1999). Researchers need 
to examine these factors in studies of organizational change 
(Hinings and Greenwood, 1996). Second, we should hold 
open the possibility that institutional actors have multiple and 
often inconsistent interests (Meyer and Rowan, 1977). In this 
study, state legislatures produced several policies that aimed 
to promote or inhibit change among rural hospitals (Mueller, 
1992). In some cases, legislatures also passed laws that cir- 
cumvented markets and provided rural hospitals directly with 
funds either to support them in their current state or to sup- 
port divergent change. Other actors, especially the boards of 
multihospital systems and publicly owned hospitals, worked 
either to change rural hospitals or keep them the same. 
Third, institutional analyses of organizational change should 
recognize that actors are not necessarily bound by history or 
taken-for-granted practices (Fligstein, 1997). We found, for 
example, that state legislatures were quite active, passing 
laws that were more or less supportive of rural hospitals. To 
continue linking the old and new institutional approaches, per- 
haps studies should be event-focused (e.g., we focused on 
rural hospitals after the reform of Medicare payment). Studies 
that are not event-focused may fail to capture how actors pur- 
sue their interests and may thus incorrectly conclude that tradi- 
tion limits actors to maintaining the status quo. 
Finally, examining only institutional forces will not be suffi- 
cient to explain divergent organizational change. Both institu- 
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tional and market forces are likely to affect divergent change 
to varying degrees in different organizational fields and, prob- 
ably, in different historical periods. Moreover, institutional and 
market forces may interact in important ways to affect orga- 
nizational change, and future research should aim to specify 
their roles more precisely. 
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